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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

In re:
COMPACT DISC MINIMUM ADVERTISED
PRICE ANTITRUST LITIGATION

)
)
)

MDL Docket No.1361

)
__________________________________________________ )

PLAINTIFF STATES’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff States submit this Second Amended Complaint pursuant to this Court’s
Initial Pretrial Order, dated November 29, 2000.
NATURE OF THE CASE
1.

The Plaintiff States, Commonwealths and Territories of Florida, New York, Alabama,

Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming
(collectively the “States”) bring this antitrust action against BMG Music and Bertelsmann Music
Group, Inc. (collectively “BMG”), Capitol Records, Inc., d/b/a EMI Music Distribution
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(“EMD”), Virgin Records America Inc., Priority Records, L.L.C., MTS Inc., d/b/a Tower
Records (“Tower”), Musicland Stores Corporation (“Musi cl and”), Sony Music Entertainment,
Inc. (“Sony”), Trans World Entertainment Corporation (“Trans World”), Universal Music Group,
Inc., Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. and UMG Recordings Inc. (collectively
“UMG”), Warner Music Group (“WMG”) and Wamer-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation (“WEA”),

Warner Bros. Records, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corp,, Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc., and
Rhino Entertainment Company (collectively the “WEA labels”) under the laws of the United
States and of the States to recover damages suffered by the States' consumers resulting from
illegal price-fixing agreements between each of the defendant labels and distributors of
prerecorded music (including compact discs (“CDs”), cassettes and albums) and certain
traditional retailers.
2. The consumers, who are represented by the States' Attorneys General, purchased
prerecorded music products directly from retailers during the relevant time period, from in or
about February 1995 to the present.
3. The purpose of the illegal agreements was to raise prices and reduce retail price
competition which threatened the high and stable profit margins for CDs enjoyed by both the
defendant labels and distributors and many music retailers.
4. This competitive threat arose with the entry into music retailing of several discount
retailers (for example, Best Buy, Circuit City and Target), which could profitably undercut the
prevailing high retail prices charged for CDs by traditional retailers. Consumers flocked to the
discount retailers, which rapidly gained market share at the expense of traditional retailers.
5. The traditional retailers reacted by pressuring defendant distributors to impose
minimum advertised pricing (“MAP”) policies which established the retail price levels at which
CDs were sold, thereby effectively reducing and/or eliminating retail price competition for CDs.
Responding to that pressure, and desirous of eliminating retail competition for CDs which
threatened their own high profit margins, each of the defendant distributors, with the approval
and/or support of their affiliated labels, agreed to impose stronger MAP policies. Traditional

retailers acknowledged the defendant distributors’ agreements to strengthen the MAP policies by,
among other things, sending letters to distributors thanking them for implementing stronger MAP
policies.
6. These agreements to maintain resale prices took the form of harsh MAP policies
adopted by the defendant distributors. These policies applied so broadly and punished violations
so severely that they effectively precluded discount retailers from selling CDs below the prices
set by the defendant distributors with the approval and/or support of their affiliated labels.
Discount retailers initially protested vigorously, but the severe financial penalties which
defendant distributors imposed on noncomplying retailers made resistance too costly for even the
largest discount retailers.
7. The effect of these anticompetitive agreements has been twofold. First, retail CD
prices, which had been dropping, were stabilized and then raised industry-wide. Second, the
oligopoly of defendant distributors was able to maintain high wholesale prices and margins for
CDs. As a result of both effects, consumers have paid higher prices for CDs than they would
have absent the illegal agreements.
8. Accordingly, the States seek in this action (1) to recover, on behalf of their injured
consumers, treble the damages flowing from defendants’ unlawful conduct; (2) the imposition of
civil penalties as provided by State statutes; and (3) injunctive relief sufficient to prohibit and
prevent any recurrence of defendants’ conduct.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. This complaint, which alleges violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1, is filed under and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Section 4C of the Clayton Act,
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15 U.S.C. § 15c, Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and Section 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. The States, as parens patriae on behalf of all natural persons residing
therein, seek to recover treble damages, their costs and expenses of suit and reasonable attorneys’
fees, together with injunctive relief, for the injuries sustained as a result of the violations alleged
herein by all such natural persons who purchased prerecorded music from retailers during the
period from in or about February 1995 to the present.
10. The States also allege violations of State antitrust and/or unfair competition and
related laws, and seek damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and related relief under those
State laws.
11. Jurisdiction is further conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.
12. Each of the defendants transacts business, committed an illegal or tortious act, or is
found in this District, within the meaning and scope of 15 U.S.C, § 22, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. and R.
§ 302, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).
DEFINITIONS
13. “Discount retailer” means an entity that sells prerecorded music products to
consumers through stores that do not specialize in prerecorded music products. Discount
retailers include, but are not limited to, mass merchandisers and electronics superstores such as
Best Buy, Circuit City, K-Mart, Target and Wal-Mart.
14. “Label” means an entity that is in the business of producing prerecorded music,
including contracting with artists and promoting prerecorded music products,
15. “Distributor” means an entity that distributes prerecorded music products on behalf
of a music company or label. “Defendant distributors” means specifically BMG Music, EMI

Music Distribution, Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., Universal Music & Video Distribution, and
Wamer-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation.
16. “Traditional retailer” means an entity that specializes in selling primarily prerecorded
music products to consumers. Traditional retailers include, but are not limited to, Tower,
Musicland, Sam Goody, Record Town, Camelot, The Wall, Saturday Matinee, F. Y.E. (For Your
Entertainment), Coconuts, Strawberries and Spec’s.
17. The “relevant time period” is the period beginning February 1995 to the present.
THE PARTIES
18. The States bring this action in their sovereign capacities, as parens patriae on behalf
of natural persons for whom the States may act, and as parens patriae on behalf of the States’
citizens, economy and general welfare to enforce federal and state antitrust laws, and to recover
damages sustained by natural person citizens as a result of illegal anticompetitive conduct.
19. Defendant BMG MUSIC is a general partnership organized and existing under the
laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business at 1540 Broadway, New York,
New York. Defendant BERTELSMANN MUSIC GROUP, INC. (together with BMG Music,
“BMG”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
principal place of business at 1540 Broadway, New York, New York, and is the controlling
general partner of BMG Music. BMG produces music and distributes CDs under various labels,
including RCA, Arista, BMG Classics, Windham Hill and Bad Boy Entertainment.
20. Defendant CAPITOL RECORDS, INC., d/b/a EMI MUSIC DISTRIBUTION
(“EMD”), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
principal place of business at 1750 North Vine Street, Hollywood, California, EMD distributes
Z'
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CDs for Capitol Records’ affiliated labels, including Capitol, Capitol Nashville, Blue Note,
Angel Records and EMI Latin. Defendant VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of
business at 338 North Foothill Road, Beverly Hills, California, is a label ultimately owned by
Capitol Records, Inc. Defendant PRIORITY RECORDS, LLC, a limited liability company
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of
business at 6430 Sunset Blvd,, Hollywood, California, is a label ultimately owned by Capitol
Records, Inc.
21. Defendant MTS, INC., d/b/a TOWER RECORDS (“Tower”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of
business at 2500 Del Monte Street-Building C, West Sacramento, California. MTS owns and
franchises more than 230 stores in nearly 20 countries. Its Tower stores offer a wide selection of
prerecorded music, books and videos.
22. Defendant MUSICLAND STORES CORPORATION (“Musicland”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of
business at 10400 Yellow Circle Drive, Minnetonka, Minnesota. Musicland operates more than
1,300 retail stores nationwide, including nearly 700 mall-based Sam Goody and Musicland
stores, which sell CDs, videos and related items.
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23. Defendant SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC, (“Sony”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of
business at 550 Madison Avenue, New York, New York. Sony produces music and distributes
CDs under various labels, including Columbia, Epic, WORK Group, C2, Nashville, Sony
J"7

Classical, and Sony Wonder.
24. Defendant TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION (“Trans
World”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, with its
principal place of business at 38 Corporate Circle, Albany, New York. Trans World operates
over 900 specialty music and video stores in 44 states, including mall-based stores under the
names Record Town, Camelot Music, The Wall, Saturday Matinee and F.Y.E. (For Your
Entertainment) and free-standing stores under the names Coconuts Music & Movies,
Strawberries, Spec’s Music and Planet Music.
25. Defendant UNIVERS AL MUSIC GROUP, INC. (“UNI”) is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of California with its principal place of business at 100 Universal
City Plaza, Universal City, California. Defendants UNIVERSAL MUSIC & VIDEO
DISTRIBUTION CORP. and UMG RECORDINGS INC. (collectively “UMG”) are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with their principal
places of business at 70 Universal City Plaza, Universal City, California. UMG produces and
distributes prerecorded music under various labels, including A&M, Def Jam, Geffen, Island,
MCA, Motown, Polydor, Universal and Verve,
26. Defendant WARNER-ELEKTRA-ATLANTIC CORPORATION (“WEA”) is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York with its principal
place of business at 111 North Hollywood Way, Burbank, California. Defendant WARNER
MUSIC GROUP, INC. (“WMG”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New
York, Defendant WARNER BROS. RECORDS INC., is a corporation organized and existing

prerecorded music products, were in the regular, continuous and substantial flow of interstate
commerce and have had and do have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS
30. The product markets in this case are wholesale and retail sales of prerecorded music,
including markets and submarkets for CDs, cassettes, and albums. Such products are highly
valued by consumers, and have no close substitutes.
31. The geographic markets in this case are the United States, for sales of prerecorded
music at wholesale, and national, local and regional markets and submarkets throughout the
United States, for sales of prerecorded music at retail.
THE PRERECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY
32. Each year, consumers pay billions of dollars at retail for prerecorded music products,
the vast majority of which are CDs, According to an industry trade association estimate, in 1999,
the total U.S. market for prerecorded music was estimated at $14.6 billion.
33. Since a spate of merger activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the prerecorded
music industry has been dominated by six major holding companies, BMG, EME, Sony,
Universal, Time Warner and PolyGram. Their number was reduced to five when Universal’s
parent company acquired PolyGram in July 1998, Generally, these holding companies are
vertically integrated, comprising both labels and distribution companies. Artists enter into '
contracts with labels, generally for a certain number of releases during the contract term.
Generally, the label is responsible, working jointly with the artists, for “content development”
and for manufacturing. Each label also plays a role, with its affiliated distribution company, in
the marketing of the finished product. The distribution company is responsible for the wholesale
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sale and distribution to retailers of new releases and “catalog” works from inventory.
34. There is a fringe of “independent” music distributors, but high barriers to entry
shield the defendant distributors both from expansion by such fringe firms and from significant
new entry into the wholesale market for prerecorded music by new firms. These barriers arise
from, among other things, the advantages that their established position and ownership of “back
catalogs” of successful recordings confer on the major distributors. For example, the enormous
financial resources of the defendants give them decisive advantages over would-be competitors
in acquiring and maintaining control of a portfolio of successful artists.
35. The result of these and other factors is that, at the wholesale level, the prerecorded
music industry is highly concentrated. The wholesale market is dominated by only a few sellers
whose market shares have remained relatively stable over time and which view each other as
their only effective competitors.
36. The defendant distributors and labels promote their products directly and pay retailers
to promote them. These promotional efforts are usually either media advertisements, or some
form of in-store promotion. In-store promotions often involve eye-catching placement of a
particular product, for example at an end-cap (the end of a merchandise aisle) or at the cash
register. The promotional funds that the defendant distributors and labels are able to provide to
retailers are very substantial, running to many millions of dollars annually. Moreover, those '
promotional payments often exceed the cost to the retailer of providing the promotional services
in question.
THE THREAT OF COMPETITION
37. Entry into the retail prerecorded music market by discount retailers in the early 1990s
11

introduced competition into the retail, and then threatened the wholesale, market for prerecorded
music. The danger presented by this new competition quickly became apparent to traditional
retailers. The new entrants, including discount retailers Best Buy and Circuit City, offered
competitive prices to consumers. According to the estimate of one traditional retailer, the
average price of a CD went from $15 to $10 in a short period of time.
38. Discount retailers’ sales grew dramatically, and price competition among music
retailers spread. Although the traditional retailers were forced to drop their prices to some extent,
they nevertheless lost market share to the discount retailers such as Best Buy, Circuit City,
Target, Wal-Mart, and K-Mart.
39. It was not only traditional retailers who felt threatened. The defendant distributors
recognized that retail price competition was beginning to put pressure on wholesale margins as
well, affecting their ability to raise wholesale prices charged to retailers.
40. The defendant distributors initially instituted MAP policies early in the 1990s.
Pursuant to the terms of these policies, retailers could not obtain reimbursement for advertising
expenditures for titles advertised below the prices listed on pricing schedules. But these MAP
policies did not push back the rising tide of price competition. As reported in the March 22,1997
issue of Billboard., “When the price war began, the six majors each implemented their own MAP
policies, but those early efforts were considered ineffective.”
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THE SCHEME TO STOP COMPETITION
41. The defendant distributors, labels and retailers belong to the National Association of
Recording Merchandisers (“NARM”), an industry trade association. Representatives of the
defendant distributors, labels and retailers regularly attended meetings of NARM. The defendant
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distributors’ officers and chief executives have served on the board of directors and other various
committees and groups of NARM, as have the retailers.
42. NARM provided a forum for private discussions between retailers, labels and
distributors regarding MAP policies and MAP pricing levels.
43. By 1995, with price competition intensifying, and traditional retailers in deepening
financial difficulties, these retailers began sending the strong message to the defendant
distributors that decisive steps were necessary. In February 1995, Jack Eugster, the CEO of
defendant Musicland, delivered the keynote address at the NARM convention.
44. Eugster, who was also NARM’s President, spoke to an audience of industry
executives, including ranking representatives of the defendant distributors, labels and retailers.
He decried the devaluation of CDs and called for a return to a sane marketplace.
45. In advocating joint action between the defendant distributors, labels and traditional
retailers in the form of strengthened MAP programs, Eugster said:
This discussion brings us then to retailer, distributor and music company
partnerships. More than ever, these partnerships need to be tightened. Our
industry health is going to depend on proactive programs that are targeted to
prevent the devaluation of CD’s. As record companies, be wary of marketers who
use your products as shills, come-ons and loss-leaders for other merchandise....
For years, wholesalers in many industries have found that minimum advertised
price programs to qualify co-op dollars have been especially effective in
supporting the value of perceptions of their merchandise. Most music companies
and movie studios have MAP programs. These programs accomplish their goals
best when the MAP price is sufficiently above wholesale cost as to not de-value
the product in the consumer’s mind. Also, effective MLAP programs consider
in-store pricing as well as advertised prices and condition co-op support for the
entire ad on MAP compliance.
46. Following the NARM convention of 1995, traditional retailers, including defendants

Musicland, Tower and Trans World, continued to press the defendant distributors to strengthen
their MAP programs by implementing the provisions which Eugster had proposed. For example,
in April 1995, a representative of defendant Tower met with an executive of EMD to urge EMD
to increase MAP without raising wholesale prices.
47. An executive of defendant Musicland lobbied representatives of each defendant
distribution company for the imposition of stronger MAP policies. This executive urged
defendant distributors to implement MAP policies with penalties that were sufficiently severe to
insure MAP compliance by discount retailers.
48. Gradually, and under persistent pressure, each of the defendant distributors with the
approval and/or support of their affiliated labels agreed to implement stronger MAP policies.
49. In a series of announcements to their retail customers in 1995 and 1996, the
defendant distributors transformed their MAP programs into blunt and effective instruments for
putting an end to price competition, along the precise lines that Eugster had laid down. In three
key respects, the policies adopted by the distributor defendants were substantially similar.
50. First, the ban on communicating discounted prices to consumers was not confined to
“advertised” prices in print and electronic media. Rather, it extended to all in-store displays and
signs, with the sole exception of a small price sticker on the CD itself. In effect, the policies
prohibited virtually all commercially practicable means of communicating discounted prices io
consumers.
51. Second, a single violation by a retailer could have far-reaching economic
consequences, such as the loss of all promotional funds available from that distributor for a
period of from sixty to ninety days from the date of the violation. Moreover, a violation at a
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single store would jeopardize promotional funds for an entire chain.
52. Third, the policies broadly applied to any advertisement or promotion undertaken by
a retailer with respect to a defendant distributor’s and label’s prerecorded music products,
whether or not any advertising funds provided by the distributor and/or label were used to pay for
the advertisement or promotion. In other words, sanctions were triggered under the policies even
by advertisements or promotions funded entirely by the retailers themselves, if those
advertisements or promotions featured prices below those dictated by the defendant distributors
and/or labels.
53. By January 1,1996, defendant WEA had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
54. By July 1, 1996, defendant UMG had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
55. By July 27, 1996, defendant EMD had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
56. By August 5,1996, defendant Sony had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above,
57. By January 2, 1997, defendant BMG had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included similar provisions,

'

58. Pressure from traditional retailers played a key role not only in the initial adoption of
these stricter MAP provisions, but in ensuring that each of the distributor defendants adopted
substantially equivalent policies, so that they applied market-wide. The defendant distributors
who lagged in implementing any of these three provisions were pushed and prodded until each of
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them had adopted a uniformly tough stance toward discount retailers.
59. An executive of Camelot was particularly active in this respect. Through interoffice
memoranda, he reported to his associates on the strengthened MAP policies of the defendant
distributors. After describing the latest strict MAP provisions implemented by a particular
distributor, the executive urged his colleagues to continue pressuring the distributors who had not
yet strengthened their policies.
60. After each wave of tighter MAP policies, traditional retailers contacted the defendant
distributors to thank them and applaud their efforts in strengthening the policies.
61. Having reached their illegal agreements, the defendant distributors and traditional
retailers proceeded to enforce them. Retailers policed the agreements by informing the defendant
distributors of violations, and defendant distributors cooperated by repeatedly imposing sanctions
on discount retailers. Ultimately, the financial pain that the conspirators inflicted through such
enforcement efforts resulted in unwilling agreements by discount retailers to adhere to agreedupon price levels.
62. For example, a leading discount retailer felt compelled, after becoming the target of
MAP sanctions, to explicitly assure one distributor defendant, in writing, of its agreement to
begin adhering to the distributor’s MAP policy. Another discount retailer sought the advance
approval of a distributor defendant for certain promotional strategies to ensure that it did not fun
afoul of the distributor’s MAP policy.
63. Traditional retailers, on the other hand, repeatedly assured the defendant distributors
of their gratitude and expressed their willingness to abide by the terms and price levels of the
MAP policies.
16

THE INJURY TO COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS
64. The agreements reached between and enforced marketwide by the defendant
distributors, with the support and/or approval of the labels, and traditional retailers were in
commercial reality and practical effect agreements on resale prices, for at least three reasons.
65. First, because retailers have no incentive to sell below the advertised price, fixing
advertised price levels effectively fixes retail price levels. The purpose of media advertising is to
attract consumers to the retail stores. Advertising CDs at higher prices than they would be sold
at the retail stores would serve no logical business purpose.
66. Second, the broadening of the MAP policies to cover virtually all price
communications from retailers to consumers, whether in-store or in the media, and even to
advertisements funded solely by retailers, essentially ended retailers’ ability to sell prerecorded
music products at discounted prices.
67. Third, the fact that a single violation of the defendant distributors’ MAP policies
could entail the loss of all advertising funds that the retailer would otherwise have received
during a ninety or sixty day period meant that the cost to retailers of violating the policies was
simply too high. Defendant distributors and labels were providing upwards of millions of dollars
in advertising funds to retailers per year.
68. A sa result of these agreements, retail and wholesale prices for prerecorded music
increased. Such increases were exactly what the defendant distributors, labels and the conspiring
retailers intended to achieve by implementing their agreements on price levels.
69. There was no legitimate business reason for the MAP provisions; their sole purpose
was to eliminate competition and stabilize retail price levels. Indeed, the precise levels at which
17

MAP prices were to be set were a frequent topic of discussion between the defendant distributors
and traditional retailers.
70. Unsurprisingly, therefore, retail prices rose. The discount retailers were forced to
raise their prices, and other retailers followed suit. The causal connection between the
strengthened MAP policies and increasing prices was apparent to industry observers at the time.
By June 8, 1996, Billboard reported that “since these [MAP] policies have come into play, sanity
appears to be returning to hit pricing.”
71. Defendant Trans World itself reported in one of its securities filings the success —
from its point of view —of the MAP policies:
During 1996, many of the major music vendors began to enforce
programs such as the Minimum Advertised Pricing Program.... The
enforcement of the MAP Program has been successful in stabilizing
prices in the industry. Non-traditional retailers have ... maintained
less aggressive pricing policies. [Trans World Entertainment Corp.
Form 10-K filed March 31, 1998.]
72. With retail price pressure removed, the defendant distributors were able to increase
wholesale prices, and they did so, leading to yet higher retail prices for consumers. These retail
and wholesale price increases occurred despite the fact that, as records of one of the music
companies reveal, per-CD unit costs had decreased sharply during the 1990s. As a result of the
higher retail prices, consumers of plaintiff States have suffered economic injury.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS BMG. MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
73. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
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74. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter until the present,
Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
75. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans
World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which BMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold
to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
76. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1- 72
above.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS BMG. MUSICLAND
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
77. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1i
72 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
78. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter until the present,
Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and

commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

79. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World
and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize
the retail prices at which BMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to the
consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
80. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72
above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS EMD. VIRGIN RECORDS
AMERICA, INC» PRIORITY RECORDS. LLC. MUSICLAND.
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
81. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
82. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their coi
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
83. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland,

Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix,
raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which EMD’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
84. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS EMD. VIRGIN RECORDS
AMERICA, INC» PRIORITY RECORDS. LLC. MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
85. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
86. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators
engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
87. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland,
Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise,
maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which EMD’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable
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restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

88. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS SONY. MUSICLAND.
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
89. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
90. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
91. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower and Trans
World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which Sony’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to
the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
92. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the-conspiracies, Defendants
Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72

above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS SONY. MUSICLAND
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
93. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
94. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in unlawful
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and
commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
95. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World
and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize
the retail prices at which Sony’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to the
consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
96. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72

1

above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS UNI, UMG,
MUSICLAND. TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
97. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
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with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
98. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
99. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower and
Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain
or stabilize the retail prices at which UMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and
sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.
100. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS UNI. UMG,
MUSICLAND, TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
101. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
102. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and
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commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

103. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans
World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which UMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold
to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
104. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS WEA. WMG.
THE WEA LABELS, MUSICLAND. TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
105. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
106. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
107. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels,
Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which

'

were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which WEA’s prerecorded music
products were advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies
are per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
108. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants WEA, WMG, WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators did those things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other
things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72 above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS WEA, WMG,
THE WEA LABELS, MUSICLAND. TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
109. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
110. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
111. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels,
Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to
fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which WEA’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
112. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
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Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators did those things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other
things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72 above.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS
113. The Plaintiff States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in
paragraphs 1 - 72 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
114, The aforementioned conspiracies by Defendants and their co-conspirators were and
are in violation ofFIorida Statutes § 501.201 etseq., § 542.18; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et
seq.; Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 8-19-1 et seq., Code of Alabama (1975);
Alaska’s Antitrust Statute, AS § 45.50.562-.596 and Consumer Protection Act, AS § 45.50.471;
Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1401, et seq.; Arkansas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann, § 4-88-101 et seq. and Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75301 et seq.; The Cartwright Act, California Business & Professions Code § 16720 et seq. and
The Unfair Competition Act, California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; the
Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-24 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq.; Delaware Antitrust Act, 6 Delaware Code
Chapter 21, and Delaware’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 Delaware Code,
Subchapter 111, § 2532; Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 480-2, 480-4; Idaho Competition Act, Idaho
Code § 48-101 et seq.; Illinois Antitrust Act 740 I.L.C.S. 10/1 et seq.; Indiana Code Ann. § 24-11-1, § 24-1-2-1; Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code Chapter 553, §§ 553.1 et seq.; Kansas
Statutes Annotated §§ 50-101 et seq.; Maine Mini-Sherman Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101, 1104 and
Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207, 209; Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Com.
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Law Code Ann. §§ 11-201 et seq.; Mass. Gen. L, c. 93A; Michigan Antitrust Reform Act
(MARA), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.771 et seq.; Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.49-325D.66 (1998);
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-24-1 et seq.; Missouri Antitrust Law, §§ 416.011 et seq.; Montana Code
Annotated § 30-14-205 and Montana Code Annotated § 30-14-222; Nevada Unfair Trade
Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 598A; §1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act, §§ 57-1-1 et
seq., NMSA 1978 (1995 Repl.); North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, 75-1.1, 75-2; 4 CMC §
5201 et seq.; North Dakota’s Uniform State Antitrust Act, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-08.1-01 et seq.;
Ohio’s Valentine Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1301.01 et seq., and Ohio Rev. Code § 109.81;
Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, 79 O.S. Supp. 1999, §§ 201 et seq., and 15 O.S. (1991) §751 et
seq.; Pennsylvania common law doctrines against the unlawful restraint of trade, unjust
enrichment and civil conspiracy to commit an unlawful or tortuous act, proceeding under 71
Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. § 732-204(c); Puerto Rico Laws Ann., Title 10, ch, 13, § 257-276;
Rhode Island Antitrust Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-6 and R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5; South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, §§ 39-5-10 et seq.; Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 47-25-101 et seq.; Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983, Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code § 15.01 et seq.; Utah Code, Title 76, Chapter 10, § 76-10-911 et seq.; Vermont
Consumer Fraud Act, 9 VS A § 2451 et seq., and 9 VS A § 2465; Virginia Antitrust Act, Va. Code
§§ 59.1-9.1 et seq.; 14 V.I.C. §§ 551, 552, 605; Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW
19.86.030; West Virginia Antitrust Act, W. Va. Code §§ 47-18-1 et seq., and the West Virginia
Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code §§ 46A-1-101 et seq.; Wisconsin Trust and
Monopolies Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03(1), 133.04, 133.16, 133.17 and 133.18; Wyoming Statutes
§§ 40-4-101 through 40-4-116 and Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, Wyoming Statutes § 4028

12-101 et seq.

EFFECTS
115. Each of the aforesaid unlawful contracts, combinations and conspiracies by each of
the defendant distributors and their co-conspirators had significant adverse effects on trade and
economic competition within each of the States, including, among others, the following effects:
116. The retail purchase prices for prerecorded music products sold throughout the
United States were fixed, raised, maintained or stabilized at artificial noncompetitive levels;
117. Price competition among retailers for the sale of prerecorded music products was
restrained; and
118. Purchasers of prerecorded music products were denied the benefits of free and open
competition among retailers and among wholesalers of those products, and as a result, paid more
for such products than they would have in a competitive market.
INJURY
119. As a result of each of the illegal contracts, combinations, and conspiracies alleged
above, natural persons residing in the States have sustained injury to their property.
120. Natural persons residing within the States are threatened with further imminent and
irreparable injury to their property unless Defendants are enjoined from their illegal conduct. (
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the States pray that this Court
a.

Adjudge and decree that each of the Defendants has engaged in an unlawful contract,

combination or conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1;

b. Adjudge and decree that each of the Defendants has violated each of the state statutes
referred to above;
c. Enter judgment in favor of the States, in their sovereign capacities as parens patriae,
and against each of the Defendants, for threefold the damages determined to have been sustained
by natural persons residing within the States as a result of each of the Defendants’ violations of
the above-referenced federal and state antitrust laws;
d. Enter judgment against each Defendant for the maximum civil penalty allowed under
the above-referenced state laws;
e. Enjoin and restrain, pursuant to federal and state law, each of the Defendants from, in
any manner, directly or indirectly, maintaining or renewing the aforesaid unlawful contracts or
any concert of action having similar purpose or effect, and from adopting or following any
practice, plan, program or design having a similar purpose or effect;
f. Enter judgment in favor of the States and award all other available equitable relief,
including but not limited to, restitution and disgorgement, as the Court may deem just and proper
to redress Defendants’ violations of state law;
g. Award the States the costs and expenses of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees;
and
h. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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JURY DEMAND
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff States demand a trial by jury pursuant to Rule
38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of all issues triable of right by a jury.

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General of Maine

lohn Bi^utigam
'Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333
(207) 626-8800
Liaison Counsel for Plaintiff States

ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH
Attorney General of Florida
Richard E. Doran
Deputy Attorney General
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Chief, Antitrust Section
Lizabeth A. Leeds
Danielle Jorden
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
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Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
(850)414-3600
ELIOT SPITZER
Attorney General of New York
Harry First
Chief, Antitrust Bureau
Linda J. Garguilo
Richard Schwartz
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Assistant Attorneys General
120 Broadway, Suite 26-01
New York, NY 10271
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Supervising Deputy Attorney General
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Arnold B. Feigin
Assistant Attorney General
110 Sherman Street
Hartford, CT 06105
(860) 808-5540

M. JANE BRADY
Attorney General of Delaware
by: Stuart B. Drowos
Deputy Attorney General
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Attorney General of Maryland
by: Ellen S. Cooper
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Antitrust Division
Gary Honick
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Antitrust Division
200 St. Paul Place
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 476-6470

THOMAS F. REILLY
Attorney General
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
by: Jesse M. Caplan
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection & Antitrust Division
One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor
Boston, MA 02108
(617) 727-2200

JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON
x '. ~
ui ivn^suULi
by: Forest (Trey) W. Hanna, HI
Assistant Missouri Attorney General
Penntower Office Center
3100 Broadway, Suite 609
Kansas City, MO 84111
(816) 889-5000

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General of Michigan
by: Paul F. Novak
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Antitrust and Franchise Section
P.O. Box 30213
Lansing, MI 48909
(517)373-7117

JOSEPH P. MAZUREK
Attorney General of Montana
by: Stephen C. Bullock
Assistant Attorney General
215 North Sanders
P.O. Box 201401
Helena, MT 59620-1401
(406) 444-2026

MIKE HATCH
Attorney General State of Minnesota
by: Donald G. Heeman
Assistant Attorney General
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131
(651)296-1794

FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA
Attorney General of Nevada
by: Christopher Van Dyck
Deputy Attorney General
1000 E. William street, Suite 209
Carson City, NV 89701-3117
(775) 687-6300, ext. 240

MIKE MOORE
Attorney General of Mississippi
by: T, Hunt Cole
Special Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
P.O. Box 22947
Jackson, MS 39225
(601) 359-4230

PATRICIA A. MADRID
Attorney General of New Mexico
by: Marianne Woodard
Assistant Attorney General
6301 Indian School Road NE
Suite 400
Albuquerque, NM 87110
(505) 841-8098

MICHAEL F. EASLEY
Attorney General of North Carolina
by: K.D. Sturgis
Assistant Attorney General
North Carolina Department of Justice
114 W. Edenton Street

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON
Attorney General of Oklahoma
by: JaneF. Wheeler
Thomas A. Bates
Steve Leippert
Assistant Attorneys General

a

n

* * . . _______- . . r
i L U i n c y

x

v

„ - . .
j c i i o i u

i

P.O. Box 629
Raleigh, NC 27602 -0629
(919)716-6000

4545 N. Lincoln Blvd., Suite 260
Oklahoma City, Ok 73105
(405) 522-1013

HEIDI HEITKAMP
Attorney General of North Dakota
by: Matthew Sagsveen
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
900 East Boulevard Avenue
Bismarck, ND 58505-0041
(701)328-2595

HARDY MYERS
Attorney General of Oregon
by: Andrew E. Aubertine
Assistant Attorney General
1162 Court St. NE
Salem, OR 97310
(503) 378-4732

HERBERT D. SOLL
Attorney General
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
by: David Lochabay
Assistant Attorney General/Consumer Counsel
Caller Box 10007
Saipan, MP 96950
(670) 664-2341

D. MICHAEL FISHER
Attorney General of Pennsylvania
by: James A. Donahue, III
Chief Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust
Section
Robert F. Young
Deputy Attorney General
Joseph S. Betsko
Deputy Attorney General
Strawberry Square, 14th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
(717)787-4530

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of Ohio
by: Doreen Johnson
Chief, Antitrust Section
Beth A. Finnerty
Senior Attorney
Joseph Piccin
Assistant Attorney General
140 East Town St., 12th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 466-4328

ANGEL E. ROTGER SAB AT
Attorney General of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico
by: John A. Stewart
Deputy Attorney General of Monopolistic
Affairs
Department of Justice
Office of Monopolistic Affairs
5
P.O. Box 9020192
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00902-0192
(787) 721-2900

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE
Attorney General of Rhode Island
by: J.O. Alston
Special Assistant Attorney General
150 South Main Street
Providence, R I02903

JOHN CORNYN
Attorney General of Texas
by: Andy Taylor
First Assistant Attorney General
Linda S. Eads
Deputy Attorney General for Litigation

(401)274-4400 ext, 2401

David A. Talbot, Jr.
Chief, Consumer Protection Division
Mark To bey
Chief, Antitrust Section
John T. Prud’homme, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street, 9th Floor
Austin, TX 78711
(512) 463-2185

CHARLES M. CONDON
Attorney General of South Carolina
by: C. Havird Jones, Jr.
Senior Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 734-3680

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General of Utah
by: Wayne Klein
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)366-0310

PAUL G, SUMMERS
Attorney General and Reporter of Tennessee
by: Dennis J, Garvey
Deputy Attorney General
J. Patrick Riceci
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
425 5th Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessesse 37243
(615) 741-3694

WILLIAM H. SORRELL
Attorney General of Vermont
by: Julie Brill
Assistant Attorney General
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609-1001
(802) 828-3658

MARK L. EARLEY
Attorney General of Virginia
by: Anne Marie Cushmac
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section
Office of the Attorney General
900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 786-2116

JAMES E. DOYLE
Attorney General of Wisconsin
by: Kevin O’Connor
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 7857
123 West Washington Avenue
Madison, WI 53703-7857
(608) 266-8986

IVER A. STRIO IRON

GAY WOODHOUSE

Attorney General of the Virgin Islands
by: Joel IT, Feld
Assistant Attorney General
48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade
GERS Bldg, 2nd Floor
St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Attorney General of Washington
by: Tina E. Kondo
Antitrust Division ChigfJ3r. AAG
900 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98164-1012
(206) 464-6293

DARRELL V. McGRAW, JR.
Attorney General of West Virginia
by: Jill L. Miles
Deputy Attorney General
Douglas L. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 1789
Charleston, WV 25326
(304) 558-8986

Attorney General of Wyoming
by: Christopher Petne
Assistant Attorney General
123 Capitol Building
Cheyenne, WY 82002
(307) 777-5838

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served on this day true copies of PLAINTIFF
STATES’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, on the
following Liaison Counsel as appointed by Order of the Court:
Alfred C. Frawley, HI, Esq.
Gregory P. Hansel, Esq.
Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Haley, LLC
PO Box 9546
Portland, Maine 04112-9546
William J, Kayatta, Jr., Esq.
Clifford H. Ruprecht, Esq.
Pierce Atwood
One Monument Square
Portland, Maine 04101-4033
Joseph H. Groff, III, Esq.
Jensen, Baird, Gardner & Henry
PO Box 4510
Portland, Maine 04112-4510

Date: December 21, 2000
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X

STATE OF FLORIDA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT A. BUTTER WORTH,
STATE OF NEW YORK, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL ELIOT SPITZER,
STATE OF ALABAMA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL PRYOR,

AMENDED COMPLAINT
00 Civ. 5853 (BSJ)

STATE OF ALASKA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL BRUCE M. BOTELHO,
STATE OF ARIZONA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET NAPOLITANO,

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

STATE OF ARKANSAS, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL MARK PRYOR,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL LOCKYER,
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
STATE OF DELAWARE, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL M. JANE BRADY,
STATE OF HAWAII, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL EARL L ANZAI,
STATE OF IDAHO, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL ALAN G, LANCE,
STATE OF ILLINOIS, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL JIM RYAN,
STATE OF INDIANA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL KAREN M. FREEMAN-WILSON,
STATE OF IOWA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS J. MILLER,

S T A T E O F K A N S A S , by
A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L C A R L A J. S T O V A L L ,

STATE OF MAINE, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL ANDREW KETTERER,
STATE OF MARYLAND, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR.,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS F. REILLY,
STATE OF MICHIGAN, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM,
STATE OF MINNESOTA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL MIKE HATCH,
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL MIKE MOORE,
STATE OF MISSOURI, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON,
STATE OF MONTANA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSEPH P. MAZUREK,
STATE OF NEVADA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANKIE SUE DEL PAPA,
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL PATRICIA A. MADRID,
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHAEL F. EASLEY,
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL HEIDI HEITKAMP,
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN
MARIANA ISLANDS, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT D. SOLL,

S T A T E O F O H IO , by
A T T O R N E Y G E N E R A L B E T T Y D. M O N T G O M E R

i

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, by
ATTORNEY GENERAL W.A. DREW EDMONDSON,
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L.L.C., MTS INC., d/b/a TOWER RECORDS,
MUSICLAND STORES CORPORATION, SONY MUSIC
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., TRANS WORLD
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL
MUSIC GROUP, INC., UNIVERSAL MUSIC & VIDEO
DISTRIBUTION CORP., UMG RECORDINGS INC,,
WARNER-ELEKTRA-ATLANTIC CORPORATION,
WARNER MUSIC GROUP, INC., WARNER BROS.
RECORDS, INC., ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION,
ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC. and RHINO
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY,
Defendants.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
1.

The Plaintiff States, Commonwealths and Territories of Florida, New York, Alabama,

Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming
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(collectively the “States”) bring this antitrust action against BMG Music and Bertelsmann Music
Group, Inc. (collectively “BMG”), Capitol Records, Inc., d/b/a EMI Music Distribution
(“EMD”), Virgin Records America Inc., Priority Records, L.L.C., MTS Inc., d/b/a Tower
Records (“Tower”), Musicland Stores Corporation (“Musi cl and”), Sony Music Entertainment,
Inc. (“Sony”), Trans World Entertainment Corporation (“Trans World”), Universal Music Group,
Inc., Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. and UMG Recordings Inc. (collectively
“UMG”), Warner Music Group (“WMG”) and Wamer-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation (“WEA”),
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corp., Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc., and
Rhino Entertainment Company (collectively the “WEA labels”) under the laws of the United
States and of the States to recover damages suffered by the States’ consumers resulting from
illegal price-fixing agreements between each of the defendant labels and distributors of
prerecorded music (including compact discs (“CDs”), cassettes and albums) and certain
traditional retailers.
2. The consumers, who are represented by the States’ Attorneys General, purchased
prerecorded music products directly from retailers during the relevant time period, from in or
about February 1995 to the present.
3. The purpose of the illegal agreements was to raise prices and reduce retail price
competition which threatened the high and stable profit margins for CDs enjoyed by both the
defendant labels and distributors and many music retailers.
4. This competitive threat arose with the entry into music retailing of several discount
retailers (for example, Best Buy, Circuit City and Target), which could profitably undercut the
prevailing high retail prices charged for CDs by traditional retailers. Consumers flocked to the

discount retailers, which rapidly gained market share at the expense of traditional retailers.
5. The traditional retailers reacted by pressuring defendant distributors to impose
minimum advertised pricing (“MAP”) policies which established the retail price levels at which
CDs were sold, thereby effectively reducing and/or eliminating retail price competition for CDs.
Responding to that pressure, and desirous of eliminating retail competition for CDs which
threatened their own high profit margins, each of the defendant distributors, with the approval
and/or support of their affiliated labels, agreed to impose stronger MAP policies. Traditional
retailers acknowledged the defendant distributors’ agreements to strengthen the MAP policies by,
among other things, sending letters to distributors thanking them for implementing stronger MAP
policies.
6. These agreements to maintain resale prices took the form of harsh MAP policies
adopted by the defendant distributors. These policies applied so broadly and punished violations
so severely that they effectively precluded discount retailers from selling CDs below the prices
set by the defendant distributors with the approval and/or support of their affiliated labels.
Discount retailers initially protested vigorously, but the severe financial penalties which
defendant distributors imposed on noncomplying retailers made resistance too costly for even the
largest discount retailers.
7. The effect of these anticompetitive agreements has been twofold. First, retail CD
prices, which had been dropping, were stabilized and then raised industry-wide. Second, the
oligopoly of defendant distributors was able to maintain high wholesale prices and margins for
CDs. As a result of both effects, consumers have paid higher prices for CDs than they would
have absent the illegal agreements.

8. Accordingly, the States seek in this action (1) to recover, on behalf of their injured
consumers, treble the damages flowing from defendants’ unlawful conduct; (2) the imposition of
civil penalties as provided by State statutes; and (3) injunctive relief sufficient to prohibit and
prevent any recurrence of defendants’ conduct.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
9. This complaint, which alleges violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1, is filed under and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Section 4C of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15c, Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and Section 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. The States, as parens patriae on behalf of all natural persons residing
therein, seek to recover treble damages, their costs and expenses of suit and reasonable attorneys’
fees, together with injunctive relief, for the injuries sustained as a result of the violations alleged
herein by all such natural persons who purchased prerecorded music from retailers during the
period from in or about February 1995 to the present.
10. The States also allege violations of State antitrust and/or unfair competition and
related laws, and seek damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and related relief under those
State laws.
11. Jurisdiction is further conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.
12. Each of the defendants transacts business, committed an illegal or tortious act, or is
found in this District, within the meaning and scope of 15 U.S.C. § 22, N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. and R.
§ 302, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c).
DEFINITIONS
13. “Discount retailer” means an entity that sells prerecorded music products to
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consumers through stores that do not specialize in prerecorded music products. Discount
retailers include, but are not limited to, mass merchandisers and electronics superstores such as
Best Buy, Circuit City, K-Mart, Target and Wal-Mart.
14. “Label” means an entity that is in the business of producing prerecorded music,
including contracting with artists and promoting prerecorded music products.
15. “Distributor” means an entity that distributes prerecorded music products on behalf
of a music company or label. “Defendant distributors” means specifically BMG Music, EMI
Music Distribution, Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., Universal Music & Video Distribution, and
Wamer-Elektra-At!antic Corporation.
16. “Traditional retailer” means an entity that specializes in selling primarily prerecorded
music products to consumers. Traditional retailers include, but are not limited to, Tower,
Musicland, Sam Goody, Record Town, Camelot, The Wall, Saturday Matinee, F.Y.E, (For Your
Entertainment), Coconuts, Strawberries and Spec’s.
17. The “relevant time period” is the period beginning February 1995 to the present.
THE PARTIES
18. The States bring this action in their sovereign capacities, as parens patriae on behalf
of natural persons for whom the States may act, and as parens patriae on behalf of the States’
citizens, economy and general welfare to enforce federal and state antitrust laws, and to recover
damages sustained by natural person citizens as a result of illegal anticompetitive conduct.
19. Defendant BMG MUSIC is a general partnership organized and existing under the
laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business at 1540 Broadway, New York,
New York. Defendant BERTELSMANN MUSIC GROUP, INC. (together with BMG Music,
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“BMG”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
principal place of business at 1540 Broadway, New York, New York, and is the controlling
general partner of BMG Music. BMG produces music and distributes CDs under various labels,
including RCA, Arista, BMG Classics, Windham Hill and Bad Boy Entertainment.
20. Defendant CAPITOL RECORDS, INC., d/b/a EMI MUSIC DISTRIBUTION
(“EMD”), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its
principal place of business at 1750 North Vine Street, Hollywood, California. EMD distributes
CDs for Capitol Records’ affiliated labels, including Capitol, Capitol Nashville, Blue Note,
Angel Records and EMI Latin. Defendant VIRGIN RECORDS AMERICA, INC., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of
business at 338 North Foothill Road, Beverly Hills, California, is a label ultimately owned by
Capitol Records, Inc. Defendant PRIORITY RECORDS, LLC, a limited liability company
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California with its principal place of
business at 6430 Sunset Blvd., Hollywood, California, is a label ultimately owned by Capitol
Records, Inc.
21. Defendant MTS, INC., d/b/a TOWER RECORDS (“Tower”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of
business at 2500 Del Monte Street-Building C, West Sacramento, California. MTS owns and
franchises more than 230 stores in nearly 20 countries. Its Tower stores offer a wide selection of
prerecorded music, books and videos.
22. Defendant MUSICLAND STORES CORPORATION (“Musicland”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of

business at 10400 Yellow Circle Drive, Minnetonka, Minnesota. Musicland operates more than
1,300 retail stores nationwide, including nearly 700 mall-based Sam Goody and Musicland
stores, which sell CDs, videos and related items.
23. Defendant SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC. (“Sony”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of
business at 550 Madison Avenue, New York, New York. Sony produces music and distributes
CDs under various labels, including Columbia, Epic, WORK Group, C2, Nashville, Sony
Classical, and Sony Wonder.
24. Defendant TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION (“Trans
World”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, with its
principal place of business at 38 Corporate Circle, Albany, New York. Trans World operates
over 900 specialty music and video stores in 44 states, including mall-based stores under the
names Record Town, Camelot Music, The Wall, Saturday Matinee and F. Y.E. (For Your
Entertainment) and free-standing stores under the names Coconuts Music & Movies,
Strawberries, Spec’s Music and Planet Music.
25. Defendant UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC. (“UNI”) is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of California with its principal place of business at 100 Universal
City Plaza, Universal City, California. Defendants UNIVERSAL MUSIC & VIDEO
DISTRIBUTION CORP. and UMG RECORDINGS INC. (collectively “UMG”) are
corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with their principal
places of business at 70 Universal City Plaza, Universal City, California, UMG produces and
distributes prerecorded music under various labels, including A&M, Def Jam, Geffen, Island,
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MCA, Motown, Polydor, Universal and Verve.
26. Defendant WARNER-ELEKTRA-ATLANTIC CORPORATION (“WEA”) is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York with its principal
place of business at 1II North Hollywood Way, Burbank, California. Defendant WARNER
MUSIC GROUP, INC. (“WMG”) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New
York. Defendant WARNER BROS. RECORDS INC., is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 75 Rockefeller
Plaza, New York, New York. Defendant ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal
place of business at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York. Defendant RHINO
ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Delaware with its principal place of business at 10635 Santa Monica Blvd., Los Angeles,
California. Defendant ELEKTRA ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC. is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida with its principal place of business
at 1413 Ryan Lane, Royal Palm Beach, Florida. Warner Brothers Records Inc., Atlantic
Recording Corporation, Rhino Entertainment Company and Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.
(collectively, the “WEA labels’') produce prerecorded music that is distributed by WEA.
CO-CONSPIRATORS
27. Various firms, corporations and other persons, known and unknown to the States and
not named as defendants herein, including without limitation unnamed retailers, wholesalers,
labels, one-stops and rack jobbers, have participated as co-conspirators with the Defendants in
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the violations alleged in this Complaint and have performed acts in furtherance thereof.
TRADE AND COMMERCE
28. During the relevant period, each of the defendant distributors sold prerecorded music,
including CDs, to retailers located throughout the United States. These products were transported
across state lines, were shipped in interstate commerce, and were sold in each of the various
States by retailers.
29. The activities of each of the defendants, including receiving, distributing, and selling
prerecorded music products, were in the regular, continuous and substantial flow of interstate
commerce and have had and do have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS
30. The product markets in this case are wholesale and retail sales of prerecorded music,
including markets and submarkets for CDs, cassettes, and albums. Such products are highly
valued by consumers, and have no close substitutes.
31. The geographic markets in this case are the United States, for sales of prerecorded
music at wholesale, and national, local and regional markets and submarkets throughout the
United States, for sales of prerecorded music at retail.
THE PRERECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY
32. Each year, consumers pay billions of dollars at retail for prerecorded music products,
the vast majority of which are CDs. According to an industry trade association estimate, in 1999,
the total U.S. market for prerecorded music was estimated at $14.6 billion.
33. Since a spate of merger activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the prerecorded
music industry has been dominated by six major holding companies, BMG, EMI, Sony,

Universal, Time Warner and PoiyGram. Their number was reduced to five when Universal’s
parent company acquired PoiyGram in July 1998. Generally, these holding companies are
vertically integrated, comprising both labels and distribution companies. Artists enter into
contracts with labels, generally for a certain number of releases during the contract term.
Generally, the label is responsible, working jointly with the artists, for “content development”
and for manufacturing. Each label also plays a role, with its affiliated distribution company, in
the marketing of the finished product. The distribution company is responsible for the wholesale
sale and distribution to retailers of new releases and “catalog” works from inventory.
34. There is a fringe of “independent” music distributors, but high barriers to entry
shield the defendant distributors both from expansion by such fringe firms and from significant
new entry into the wholesale market for prerecorded music by new firms. These barriers arise
from, among other things, the advantages that their established position and ownership of “back
catalogs” of successful recordings confer on the major distributors. For example, the enormous
financial resources of the defendants give them decisive advantages over would-be competitors
in acquiring and maintaining control of a portfolio of successful artists.
35. The result of these and other factors is that, at the wholesale level, the prerecorded
music industry is highly concentrated. The wholesale market is dominated by only a few sellers
whose market shares have remained relatively stable over time and which view each other as
their only effective competitors.
36. The defendant distributors and labels promote their products directly and pay retailers
to promote them. These promotional efforts are usually either media advertisements, or some
form of in-store promotion. In-store promotions often involve eye-catching placement of a

particular product, for example at an end-cap (the end of a merchandise aisle) or at the cash
register. The promotional funds that the defendant distributors and labels are able to provide to
retailers are very substantial, running to many millions of dollars annually. Moreover, those
promotional payments often exceed the cost to the retailer of providing the promotional services
in question.
THE THREAT OF COMPETITION
37. Entry into the retail prerecorded music market by discount retailers in the early 1990s
introduced competition into the retail, and then threatened the wholesale, market for prerecorded
music. The danger presented by this new competition quickly became apparent to traditional
retailers. The new entrants, including discount retailers Best Buy and Circuit City, offered
competitive prices to consumers. According to the estimate of one traditional retailer, the
average price of a CD went from $15 to $10 in a short period of time.
38. Discount retailers1 sales grew dramatically, and price competition among music
retailers spread. Although the traditional retailers were forced to drop their prices to some extent,
they nevertheless lost market share to the discount retailers such as Best Buy, Circuit City,
Target, Wal-Mart, and K-Mart.
39. It was not only traditional retailers who felt threatened. The defendant distributors
recognized that retail price competition was beginning to put pressure on wholesale margins as
well, affecting their ability to raise wholesale prices charged to retailers.
40. The defendant distributors initially instituted MAP policies early in the 1990s.
Pursuant to the terms of these policies, retailers could not obtain reimbursement for advertising
expenditures for titles advertised below the prices listed on pricing schedules. But these MAP

policies did not push back the rising tide of price competition. As reported in the March 22, 1997
issue of Billboard, “When the price war began, the six majors each implemented their own MAP
policies, but those early efforts were considered ineffective.”
THE SCHEME TO STOP COMPETITION
41. The defendant distributors, labels and retailers belong to the National Association of
Recording Merchandisers (“NARM”), an industry trade association. Representatives of the
defendant distributors, labels and retailers regularly attended meetings of NARM. The defendant
distributors’ officers and chief executives have served on the board of directors and other various
committees and groups of NARM, as have the retailers,
42. NARM provided a forum for private discussions between retailers, labels and
distributors regarding MAP policies and MAP pricing levels.
43. By 1995, with price competition intensifying, and traditional retailers in deepening
financial difficulties, these retailers began sending the strong message to the defendant
distributors that decisive steps were necessary. In February 1995, Jack Eugster, the CEO of
defendant Musicland, delivered the keynote address at the NARM convention.
44. Eugster, who was also NARM’s President, spoke to an audience of industry
executives, including ranking representatives of the defendant distributors, labels and retailers.
He decried the devaluation of CDs and called for a return to a sane marketplace.
45. In advocating joint action between the defendant distributors, labels and traditional
retailers in the form of strengthened MAP programs, Eugster said:
This discussion brings us then to retailer, distributor and music company
partnerships. More than ever, these partnerships need to be tightened. Our
industry health is going to depend on proactive programs that are targeted to
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prevent the devaluation of CD’s. As record companies, be wary of marketers who
use your products as shills, come-ons and loss-leaders for othi
For years, wholesalers in many industries have found that minimum advertised
price programs to qualify co-op dollars have been especially effective in
supporting the value of perceptions of their merchandise. Most music companies
and movie studios have MAP programs. These programs accomplish their goals
best when the MAP price is sufficiently above wholesale cost as to not de-value
the product in the consumer’s mind. Also, effective MAP programs consider
in-store pricing as well as advertised prices and condition co-op support for the
entire ad on MAP compliance.
46. Following the NARM convention of 1995, traditional retailers, including defendants
Musicland, Tower and Trans World, continued to press the defendant distributors to strengthen
their MAP programs by implementing the provisions which Eugster had proposed. For example,
in April 1995, a representative of defendant Tower met with an executive of EMD to urge EMD
to increase MAP without raising wholesale prices.
47.

An executive of defendant Musicland lobbied representatives of each defendant

distribution company for the imposition of stronger MAP policies. This executive urged
defendant distributors to implement MAP policies with penalties that were sufficiently severe to
insure MAP compliance by discount retailers.
48. Gradually, and under persistent pressure, each of the defendant distributors with the
approval and/or support of their affiliated labels agreed to implement stronger MAP policies.
49. In a series of announcements to their retail customers in 1995 and 1996, the
defendant distributors transformed their MAP programs into blunt and effective instruments for
putting an end to price competition, along the precise lines that Eugster had laid down. In three
key respects, the policies adopted by the distributor defendants were substantially similar.
50. First, the ban on communicating discounted prices to consumers was not confined to
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“advertised” prices in print and electronic media. Rather, it extended to all in-store displays and
signs, with the sole exception of a small price sticker on the CD itself. In effect, the policies
prohibited virtually all commercially practicable means of communicating discounted prices to
consumers.
51. Second, a single violation by a retailer could have far-reaching economic
consequences, such as the loss of all promotional funds available from that distributor for a
period of from sixty to ninety days from the date of the violation. Moreover, a violation at a
single store would jeopardize promotional funds for an entire chain,
52. Third, the policies broadly applied to any advertisement or promotion undertaken by
a retailer with respect to a defendant distributor’s and label’s prerecorded music products,
whether or not any advertising funds provided by the distributor and/or label were used to pay for
the advertisement or promotion. In other words, sanctions were triggered under the policies even
by advertisements or promotions funded entirely by the retailers themselves, if those
advertisements or promotions featured prices below those dictated by the defendant distributors
and/or labels.
53. By January I, 1996, defendant WEA had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
54. By July 1, 1996, defendant UMG had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
55. By July 27, 1996, defendant EMD had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
56. By August 5, 1996, defendant Sony had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
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included all of the provisions outlined in paragraphs 50-52 above.
57. By January 2, 1997, defendant BMG had implemented a stronger MAP policy that
included similar provisions.
58. Pressure from traditional retailers played a key role not only in the initial adoption of
these stricter MAP provisions, but in ensuring that each of the distributor defendants adopted
substantially equivalent policies, so that they applied market-wide. The defendant distributors
who lagged in implementing any of these three provisions were pushed and prodded until each of
them had adopted a uniformly tough stance toward discount retailers.
59. An executive of Camelot was particularly active in this respect. Through interoffice
memoranda, he reported to his associates on the strengthened MAP policies of the defendant
distributors. After describing the latest strict MAP provisions implemented by a particular
distributor, the executive urged his colleagues to continue pressuring the distributors who had not
yet strengthened their policies.
60. After each wave of tighter MAP policies, traditional retailers contacted the defendant
distributors to thank them and applaud their efforts in strengthening the policies.
61. Having reached their illegal agreements, the defendant distributors and traditional
retailers proceeded to enforce them. Retailers policed the agreements by informing the defendant
distributors of violations, and defendant distributors cooperated by repeatedly imposing sanctions
on discount retailers. Ultimately, the financial pain that the conspirators inflicted through such
enforcement efforts resulted in unwilling agreements by discount retailers to adhere to agreedupon price levels.
62. For example, a leading discount retailer felt compelled, after becoming the target of
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MAP sanctions, to explicitly assure one distributor defendant, in' writing, of its agreement to
begin adhering to the distributor's MAP policy. Another discount retailer sought the advance
approval of a distributor defendant for certain promotional strategies to ensure that it did not run
afoul of the distributor’s MAP policy.
63. Traditional retailers, on the other hand, repeatedly assured the defendant distributors
of their gratitude and expressed their willingness to abide by the terms and price levels of the
MAP policies.
THE INJURY TO COMPETITION AND CONSUMERS
64. The agreements reached between and enforced marketwide by the defendant
distributors, with the support and/or approval of the labels, and traditional retailers were in
commercial reality and practical effect agreements on resale prices, for at least three reasons.
65. First, because retailers have no incentive to sell below the advertised price, fixing
advertised price levels effectively fixes retail price levels. The purpose of media advertising is to
attract consumers to the retail stores. Advertising CDs at higher prices than they would be sold
at the retail stores would serve no logical business purpose.
66. Second, the broadening of the MAP policies to cover virtually all price
communications from retailers to consumers, whether in-store or in the media, and even to
advertisements funded solely by retailers, essentially ended retailers’ ability to sell prerecorded
music products at discounted prices.
67. Third, the fact that a single violation of the defendant distributors’ MAP policies
could entail the loss of all advertising funds that the retailer would otherwise have received
during a ninety or sixty day period meant that the cost to retailers of violating the policies was
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simply too high. Defendant distributors and labels were providing upwards of millions of dollars
in advertising funds to retailers per year.
68. As a result of these agreements, retail and wholesale prices for prerecorded music
increased. Such increases were exactly what the defendant distributors, labels and the conspiring
retailers intended to achieve by implementing their agreements on price levels.
69. There was no legitimate business reason for the MAP provisions; their sole purpose
was to eliminate competition and stabilize retail price levels. Indeed, the precise levels at which
MAP prices were to be set were a frequent topic of discussion between the defendant distributors
and traditional retailers.
70. Unsurprisingly, therefore, retail prices rose. The discount retailers were forced to
raise their prices, and other retailers followed suit. The causal connection between the
strengthened MAP policies and increasing prices was apparent to industry observers at the time.
By June 8, 1996, Billboard reported that “since these [MAP] policies have come into play, sanity
appears to be returning to hit pricing.”
71. Defendant Trans World itself reported in one of its securities filings the success from its point of view —of the MAP policies:
During 1996, many of the major music vendors began to enforce
programs such as the Minimum Advertised Pricing Program.... The
enforcement of the MAP Program has been successful in stabilizing
prices in the industry. Non-traditional retailers have ... maintained
less aggressive pricing policies. [Trans World Entertainment Corp.
Form 10-K filed March 31, 1998.]
72. With retail price pressure removed, the defendant distributors were able to increase
wholesale prices, and they did so, leading to yet higher retail prices for consumers. These retail

and wholesale price increases occurred despite the fact that, as records of one of the music
companies reveal, per-CD unit costs had decreased sharply during the 1990s. As a result of the
higher retail prices, consumers of plaintiff States have suffered economic injury.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS BMG. MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION I OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
73. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
74. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter until the present,
Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
75. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans
World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which BMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold
to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
76. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1- 72
above.
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(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION I OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
77. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
78. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter until the present,
Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and
commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
79. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World
and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize
the retail prices at which BMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to the
consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade in
violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.
80. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
BMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72
above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS EMI). VIRGIN RECORDS
AMERICA, INC.. PRIORITY RECORDS, LLC. MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
81. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
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with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.

82. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musi cl and, Tower and Trans World and their co
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
83. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland,
Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix,
raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which EMD’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
84. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS EMD. VIRGIN RECORDS
AMERICA, INC» PRIORITY RECORDS. LLC, MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
85. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
86. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators

engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
87. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland,
Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise,
maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which EMD’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable
restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
88. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
EMD and affiliated labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS SONY. MUSICLAND,
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
89. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
90. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
91. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower and Trans
22

World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which Sony’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to
the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
92. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72
above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS SONY, MUSICLAND
TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
93. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
94. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in unlawful
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and
commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
95. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action among Defendants Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World
and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize
the retail prices at which Sony’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold to the
consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

96. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies, Defendants
Sony, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those things which they
combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72
above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS UNI, UMG,
MUSICLAND. TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
97. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-72
with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
98. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
99. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower and
Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain
or stabilize the retail prices at which UMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and
sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are per se violations of Section
1 of the Sherman Act,
100. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above. ■

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS UNI. UMG,
MUSI GLAND, TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OE SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
101. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
102. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators engaged in
unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and
commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
103. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans
World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to fix, raise, maintain or
stabilize the retail prices at which UMG’s prerecorded music products were advertised and sold
to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are unreasonable restraints of trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
104. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants UNI, UMG, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators did those
things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other things, set forth in
paragraphs 1-72 above.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS WEA, WMG,
THE WEA LABELS. MUSICLAND, TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(PER SE VIOLATION. OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
105. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.

106. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
107. The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels,
Musicland, Tower and Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which
were to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which WEA’s prerecorded music
products were advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies
are per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
108. For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants WEA, WMG, WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators did those things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other
things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72 above.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO DEFENDANTS WEA. WMG,
THE WEA LABELS. MUSICLAND, TOWER AND TRANS WORLD
(RULE OF REASON VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT)
109. The States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 172 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.
110. Beginning in or about February 1995, and continuing thereafter to the present,
Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators engaged in unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
interstate trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

111 The combinations and conspiracies consisted of continuing agreements,
understandings, or concert of action between Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels,
Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to
fix, raise, maintain or stabilize the retail prices at which WEA’s prerecorded music products were
advertised and sold to the consuming public. Such combinations or conspiracies are an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
112 For the purpose of forming, effectuating, and furthering the conspiracies,
Defendants WEA, WMG, the WEA labels, Musicland, Tower, Trans World and their co
conspirators did those things which they combined, agreed, and conspired to do as, among other
things, set forth in paragraphs 1-72 above.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF AS TO EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS
113 The Plaintiff States repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained in
paragraphs 1 - 72 with the same force and effect as if here set forth in full.

114 The aforementioned conspiracies by Defendants and their co-conspirators were and
are in violation of Florida Statutes § 501.201 etseq., § 542.18; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340 et
seq/, Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 8-19-1 et seq., Code of Alabama (1975);
Alaska’s Antitrust Statute, AS § 45.50.562-.596 and Consumer Protection Act, AS § 45.50.471;
Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1402, et seq.; Arkansas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq. and Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75301 et seq. \ The Cartwright Act, California Business & Professions Code § 16720 et seq. and
The Unfair Competition Act, California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.\

Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 35-24 et seq.; Delaware Antitrust Act, 6 Delaware Code Chapter 21,
and Delaware’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 Delaware Code, Subchapter 111, §
2532; Hawaii Revised Statutes §§ 480-2, 480-4; Idaho Competition Act, Idaho Code § 48-101 et
seq.; Illinois Antitrust Act 740 I.L.C.S. 10/1 et seq.; Indiana Code Ann. § 24-1-1-1, § 24-1-2-1;
Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code Chapter 553, §§ 553.1 et seq.; Kansas Statutes Annotated §§
50-101 et seq.; Maine Mini-Sherman Act, 10M.R.S.A. §§ 1101, 1104 and Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207, 209; Maryland Antitrust Act, Md. Com. Law Code Ann. §§
11-201 et seq.; Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A; Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA), Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 445.771 et s e q Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.49-325D.66 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7524- 1 et seq.; Missouri Antitrust Law, §§ 416.011 et seq,; Montana Code Annotated § 30-14-205
and Montana Code Annotated § 30-14-222; Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act, Nev. Rev. Stat,
Chapter 598A; §1 of the New Mexico Antitrust Act, §§ 57-1-1 et seq., NMSA 1978 (1995
Repl.); North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, 75-1.1, 75-2; 4 CMC § 5201 et seq.; North
Dakota’s Uniform State Antitrust Act, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-08.1-01 et seq.; Ohio’s Valentine
Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1331.01 et seq.; Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, 79 O.S. Supp. 1999,
§§201 et seq.; 75 Pennsylvania Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.; Puerto Rico Laws Ann., Title 10, ch.
13, § 257-276; Rhode Island Antitrust Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-6; South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act, §§ 39-5-10 et seq.; Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4725- 101 et seq.; Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983, Tex. Bus. & Com, Code § 15.01
et seq.; Utah Code, Title 76, Chapter 10, § 76-10-911 et seq.; Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, 9
VSA § 2451 et seq.; Virginia Antitrust Act, Va. Code §§ 59.1-9.1 et seq.; 14 V.I.C. §§ 551, 552,
605; Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.030; West Virginia Antitrust Act, W.

Va. Code §§ 47-18-1 et seq., and the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va.
Code §§ 46A-1-101 et seq.; Wisconsin Trust and Monopolies Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03(1),
133.04, 133.16, 133.17 and 133.18; Wyoming Statutes §§ 40-4-101 through 40-4-116 and
Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, Wyoming Statutes § 40-12-101 et seq.
EFFECTS
115 Each of the aforesaid unlawful contracts, combinations and conspiracies by each of
the defendant distributors and their co-conspirators had the following effects, among others:
116 The retail purchase prices for prerecorded music products sold throughout the
United States were fixed, raised, maintained or stabilized at artificial noncompetitive levels;
117 Price competition among retailers for the sale of prerecorded music products was
restrained; and
118 Purchasers of prerecorded music products were denied the benefits of free and open
competition among retailers and among wholesalers of those products, and as a result, paid more
for such products than they would have in a competitive market.
INJURY
119 A sa result of each of the illegal contracts, combinations, and conspiracies alleged
above, natural persons residing in the States have sustained injury to their property.
120 Natural persons residing within the States are threatened with further imminent and
irreparable injury to their property unless Defendants are enjoined from their illegal conduct.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the States pray that this Court
a. Adjudge and decree that each of the Defendants has engaged in an unlawful contract,

combination or conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1;
b. Adjudge and decree that each of the Defendants has violated each of the state statutes
referred to above;
c. Enter judgment in favor of the States, in their sovereign capacities as parens patriae,
and against each of the Defendants, for threefold the damages determined to have been sustained
by natural persons residing within the States as a result of each of the Defendants' violations of
the above-referenced federal and state antitrust laws;
d. Enter judgment against each Defendant for the maximum civil penalty allowed under
the above-referenced state antitrust laws;
e. Award the States the costs and expenses of suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees;
f. Enjoin and restrain each of the Defendants from, in any manner, directly or indirectly,
maintaining or renewing the aforesaid unlawful contracts or any concert of action having similar
purpose or effect, and from adopting or following any practice, plan, program or design having a
similar purpose or effect; and
g. Grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff States demand a trial by jury pursuant to Rule
38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of all issues triable of right by a jury.
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